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 1 
Introduction: Modernity, Time, Bergson  
 
Dare to know! –– this was Kant’s suggestion as the motto of the Enlightenment. In the 
coming age of modernity, humans would no longer be dependent upon others to understand 
themselves and the world, but instead they would bring their “self-imposed nonage” to an end by 
overcoming their laziness and cowardice. In its place, they would cultivate “the spirit of a 
reasonable appreciation of man's value and of his duty to think for himself.”1 Free thought, hence 
freedom, would gush forth like spring water.  
Freedom gushed forth indeed, whatever it is or was meant to be, with some side effects 
not fully advertised. “The fully enlightened earth radiates disaster triumphant,”2 would write 
Adorno and Horkheimer in the shadow of National Socialism and the Holocaust, as the noble 
wish to understand oneself and the world had evolved into a will to dominate nature and other 
human beings. This destructive desire co-developed with the rise of homogenizing abstraction 
and mathematical thinking (what could not be described as a number was made into one), 
manifesting itself as science, technology, and industry. “Abstraction, the tool of enlightenment, 
treats its objects as did fate, the notion of which it rejects: it liquidates them.”3 The enlightened 
turned out to be even a bit of a sadist.4 And as World War II concluded and the Europeans found 
themselves surrounded by concentration camps and ruined cities, as Europe had become those 
things, modernity became suspect.  
                                                
1 Immanuel Kant, “What is Enlightenment?”, December 1784, translated by Mary C. Smith. 
2 Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, translated by John Cummings, 1972 
edition, Herder and Herder, New York, p. 3. 
3 Adorno and Horkheimer, p. 13, emphasis mine. 
4 From the Excursus II of Dialectic: “Reason is the organ of calculation, of planning; it is neutral in regard to ends; 
its element is coordination. What Kant grounded transcendentally, the affinity of knowledge and planning, which 
impressed the stamp of inescapable expediency on every aspect of a bourgeois existence that was wholly 
rationalized, even in every breathing-space, Sade realized empirically more than a century before sport was 
conceived. The teams of modern sport, whose interaction is so precisely regulated that no member has any doubt 
about his role, and which provide a reserve for every player, have their exact counterpart in the sexual teams of 
Juliette, which employ every moment usefully, neglect no human orifice, and carry out every function” (p. 88).  
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Uwe Johnson of East Germany, often known for his post-war epic Anniversaries, was 
one such European. His father died in a Soviet camp during the war, and authorities interrupted 
his education because he did not support the communist regime of the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR), which existed under the patronage of the Soviet Union. His 1959 novel, 
Speculations about Jakob, on which I will focus here, is about the mysterious death of Jakob, an 
East German railroad dispatcher: to the shock of everyone, he is run over by a train, and the book 
deals with the confusion about the incident. A heartbreaking love story and a captivating 
detective novel, it is also a piercing critique of modernity as exemplified by the scientific-
Marxist government of GDR. Johnson was well aware of the political weight of his work: as the 
book went into print in the other Germany, he hopped off the train in West Berlin, just like his 
mother had done three years ago in 1956.5  
Almost simultaneously, Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar from Turkey, both of Europe and not, 
was serializing The Time Regulation Institute (TRI) in a newspaper, having started in 1954 (the 
work would be published as a book in 1961). There we hear from a certain Hayri Irdal, who 
writes about his relationship with clocks, alchemy, spirits, and Halit Ayarci, with whom he starts 
the Time Regulation Institute, a state-supported agency that aims to implement a standardized 
time-consciousness in Turkey for the sake of progress. On its surface, the book is a satire of the 
Europhilic Turkish elite that pushed for top-down modernization, but Tanpınar’s critique extends 
to the last century of the Ottomans, during which modernization was initiated. What is more 
relevant here is that TRI, like Johnson’s Speculations, interrogates modernity as such, especially 
when imposed too hastily on a society that is maybe not ready for it, causing what Tanpınar 
called “a crisis of self and consciousness.”6   
                                                
5 “Title Page of Uwe Johnson’s Mutmassungen über Jakob Using the Pseudonym Joachim Catt,” Arts in Exile. 
6  Tanpınar, Beş Şehir, Dergah Yayınları, Istanbul, 1987, p. 112. Translation mine. 
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Here, I will consider Johnson’s Speculations and Tanpınar’s TRI as two critiques of 
modernity from the 1950s from two countries that were run by modern authoritarian 
governments. More specifically, I will focus on time and temporality, i.e. I will read these two 
texts as critiques of modernity’s thinking about and perception of time. By “time,” I am referring 
to both the daily experience of time (of seconds and hours) and the problem of historical time 
(past, present, future). I am considering two different but related questions: (1) “what time is it,” 
and (2) “where are we in time?” 
  (1): If we understand the modern person to be, in the vein of Adorno and Horkheimer, a 
rational being who has a conscious or subconscious desire to dominate, for which he makes use 
of abstraction and numerical thinking, it is no surprise that the abstracted time of seconds, 
minutes, and hours is a useful tool for him. In the case of nature, he can get a better sense of 
patterns, or suggest patterns that approximate reality, which can aid his decisions surrounding 
intervention: “When exactly does X happen, how long does it take Y to grow?”  
In the case of humans, the use of abstracted time as a tool of exploitation coincides 
historically with the rise of capitalism and wage labor, as we learned from E.P. Thompson. 
While the peasant’s approach to time was task-oriented, as “sheep must be attended at lambing 
time… cows must be milked… [and] once iron is in the making, the furnaces must not be 
allowed to fail,” when employers start hiring people, “they must use the time… and see it is not 
wasted: not the task but the value of time when reduced to money is dominant. Time is now 
currency: it is not passed but spent.”7 As early as in the mid-1700s, The Crowley Iron Works in 
England was using timesheets to monitor their workers. Naturally, the long-term success of this 
new cultural system of labor and work depended on the collective adoption of abstracted time as 
                                                
7 E.P. Thompson, “Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism,” Past & Present 38, December 1967, pp. 60-
61. Emphasis mine.  
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a standard, which was achieved through the aggressive preaching of the doctrine of time-
thriftiness and the economic democratization of timepieces, which were, at their conception, 
serious status symbols, and therefore objects of desire for lower classes who wanted to at least 
present the appearance of hard work, success, and prosperity. A watch on one’s wrist or a chain 
hanging from the button to the pocket of one’s vest could “say” a lot about a person.  
However, abstracted time as a tool for human control does not necessarily rely on it being 
coupled with the institution of wage-labor. Working with machines may result directly in some 
mental rewiring. As one of Thompson’s sources claimed, “machinery seems to lead to habits of 
calculation… A machine worked so many hours in the week would produce so much length of 
yarn of cloth. Minutes were felt to be factors in these results, whereas in the Potteries hours, or 
even days at times, were hardly felt to be such factors.”8 The operator of a machine is made 
conscious of time as a part of the production function, which produces, in return, a more general 
awareness and acceptance of abstracted time. Or, alternatively, think about a railroad worker, 
like Jakob, who is responsible for making sure that the trains are on time, all the time. For him, 
the adoption of abstracted time does not stem from the employer trying to get the most out of his 
labor, or from the nature of the machine, but from the presence of a schedule (pertaining to a 
transportation system that is, admittedly, machine-like), to which he must adhere.  
Henri Bergson (1859-1941), whose philosophy of duration was highly influential for 
20th-century philosophy and literary modernism, wrote exhaustively on the tyranny of abstracted 
time from the perspective of the self. Taking a stance against Kant’s adoption of space as a 
priori, which had guided Kant’s take on time, Bergson argues that while “time at first seems to 
us to be a measurable magnitude, just like space,” pure duration, which is real time as originally 
                                                
8 “An Old Potter,” When I was a Child, London, 1903, pp. 16, 47-9, 52-4, 57-8, 71, 74-5, 81, 185-6, 191 (as quoted 
in Thompson; sorry). 
 5 
perceived by human consciousness, is “not a quantity” but “the melting of states of 
consciousness into one another.”9 Abstracted time results in a static view of time –– first one 
second, and then another — while our inner experience is one of movement, like seconds 
pouring into seconds as each second as a time-marker dissolves into oblivion (and even this 
specific attempt at description is a betrayal, as I do utilize the concept of the second). Things 
move; they do not stop and go and stop and go. With such claims against the hegemony of 
staticizing abstraction through spatialization (i.e. the perception of time through the lens of 
space, thus making it dividable and measurable), Bergson acquired for himself quite the enemies. 
Bertrand Russell, to take one high-profile example, called him an anti-intellectual, comparing 
him to ants and bees.10  
Tanpınar explicitly counts Bergson as one of his influences in his often quoted “Letter to 
the Youth from Antalya,”11 and in TRI there exists a kahve (a traditional, anti-hipster coffee 
shop) where “Bergsonian philosophy” is discussed among “Aristotelian logic” and “common 
gossip.”12 The connection between Johnson and Bergson is a bit harder to identify. As far as I 
know, there is no evidence of Johnson having extensively studied Bergson, but his admiration of 
Faulkner is well-documented: he would read The Sound and the Fury aloud to his college friends 
in English, quickly translating the confusing passages to German when necessary.13 Faulkner, in 
return, was open about his agreement, as he once proclaimed in an interview with Loïc Bouvard, 
with “Bergson’s theory of the fluidity of time. There is only the present moment in which I 
                                                
9 Henri Bergson, Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness, Edinburgh, Riverside 
Press, 1950, pp. 104, 107. 
10 Bertrand Russell, The History of Western Philosophy, Touchstone, 1945, pp. 791, 793. 
11 Özen Nergis Dolcerocca, “Foreword,” Middle Eastern Literatures 20, no. 2, 2017, pp. 128. 
12  Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, Saatleri Ayarlama Enstitüsü, Dergah Yayınları, 1987 (September 2019), pp. 131. 
Translation mine. If I am citing from this Turkish version and the text is in English, it means that I translated it 
myself. 
13 Peter Nicolaisen, “Faulkner and Southern History: A View from Germany,” Southern Cultures 4, no. 4, 1998, pp. 
31. 
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include both the past and the future, and this is eternity.”14 The other probable connection is 
through Walter Benjamin, whose ideas are materialized in Johnson’s works.15 Benjamin’s 
engagement with Bergson’s ideas is clear in “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” where Bergson is 
said to “reject… any historical determination of memory,” and in whose philosophy “the eye 
perceives an experience of a complementary nature in the form of its spontaneous after-image, as 
it were”16 (I’ll come back to the issue of past/memory in a bit). Incidentally, Benjamin also 
considers Proust, Freud, Valery, and Poe next to Bergson in his essay, a list almost identical to 
the one given by Tanpınar in the aforementioned “Letter.” It turns out that Johnson and 
Tanpınar, while probably having never met and/or read each other’s work, were tapping into the 
same literary and philosophical traditions.  
(2): In comparison to “what time is it,” the question “where are we in time” has more 
macro-scale concerns. It is about the subject’s temporal position on a supposed line of general 
history. In the case of the infant Republic of Turkey, this question was a source of immense 
ontological anxiety. As Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the Republic, put it on the tenth 
year anniversary of the republic, the Turkish nation was now supposed to leave behind “the 
lethargic mentality of past centuries” and embrace “the concepts of speed and action of our 
century.” Because the “torch” carried would be “positive science” as the nation “march[ed] on 
the road of progress and civilization,” the “civilized world,” which meant Western Europe and 
the United States, would see that “the Turkish nation… is a great nation.”17 The new country’s 
raison d’etre was to change the answer to the question of where we are in time from “in the past” 
to “in the now,” the “now” defined as the socioeconomic and intellectual position at which 
                                                
14 Cleanth Brooks, “Faulkner on Time and History.” American Fiction 1914-1945, ed. Harold Bloom. New York: 
Chelsea House, 1987, pp. 239. 
15 For example, see: Gary Lee Baker, “The Influence of Walter Benjamin’s Notion of Allegory on Uwe Johnson’s 
Jahrestage: Form and Approach to History,” The German Quarterly 66, no. 3, Summer 1993, p. 318-329. 
16 Walter Benjamin, “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” Illuminations, translated by Harry Zohn, 1968, p. 157. 
17 “Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s Speech on the Occasion of the Tenth Anniversary of the Republic,” October 29, 1933.  
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modern Europe was. Similar worries, on which these newer ones would be built, were already in 
place during the Ottoman Tanzimat, the unsuccessful reform period from 1839 to 1876. 
As Reinhart Koselleck points out, “the pressure toward movement generated by this 
obsession with temporality”18 is characteristic of modernity, and both liberals and communists 
were/are guilty of utilizing the language of moving-forward for political self-advocacy. Ataturk’s 
“march on the road of progress” is a great example of this phenomenon. An underlying 
assumption of the Turkish project was that there is some sort of linearity and teleology to the 
historical development of nations, and given the appropriate nudges, the nation would get there, 
like a train on its tracks. This firm but troublesome belief in an overarching theory of history was 
also apparent in Johnson’s East Germany. Just like the way the Turkish elite believed in a 
historical endpoint of liberal freedoms and scientific rationality, the East German regime 
believed in a strict theory of history that claimed an eventual victory for the working class, and 
justified their daily violence according to that. In Speculations, this dogmatic historical-
theoretical outlook is personified by Herr Rohlfs, the state agent who is trying to recruit Jakob 
for a special mission.  
These linear and teleological theories of history are examples of historical determinism, 
the cost of which is always a denial or a constraint of genuine human freedom –– theoretical, 
real, or both. (The irony that the Enlightenment has brought us here leaves a sour taste in the 
mouth.) At this junction, Bergson’s line of thought in Time and Free Will can be extrapolated 
from its emphasis on the individual person to people and peoples. Bergson suggests that the 
Kantian answer to the freedom problem, i.e. that free will cannot exist in time, results from the 
homogenization of inner time through spatialization. When conceived as distinct spaces next to 
                                                
18  Reinhart Koselleck, “‘Neuzeit’: Remarks on the Semantics of Modern Concepts of Movement,” in Futures Past: 
On the Semantics of Historical Time, translated by Keith Tribe, New York, Columbia University, 2004, pp. 250. 
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each other, different states of consciousness are made into measurable magnitudes and rigidly 
separated from each other, making them prone to the questions such as whether State A results in 
State B or whether State C is the sum of State A and B. In reality, however, Bergson claims, the 
states of consciousness are “at once undistinguished and unstable, cannot be separated without 
changing their nature, and cannot receive a fixed form or be expressed in words without 
becoming public property.”19 In short, Bergson upholds freedom by showing that states of 
consciousness, being in duration, elude the structural inquiry of cause and effect. Freedom –– 
because it is indeterminate, or, more precisely, indeterminable — cannot be denied, but neither 
can it be defined. Simply put, “freedom is… a fact, and among the facts we observe there is none 
clearer.”20 And if free will is a fact, historical determinism is a farce, since historical movement 
is caused by many persons coming together, or against each other, and doing things in an 
indeterminable manner, any proposed law of which will be based on the above-explicated 
confusion.  
Nevertheless, something akin to a description of freedom comes in another of Bergson’s 
books, Creative Evolution, where he expands his theory of duration to provide a non-
deterministic account of evolution fueled by élan vital (vital impetus, life force), in which 
evolution goes forward creatively, by giving rise to something new that could not have been 
foreseen. The analogy here between evolution and human consciousness, both of them 
processual and indeterminable, suggests that freedom is creativity. It is no surprise that, as 
Ingeborg Nordemann points out, Hannah Arendt –– for whom the primary political condition of 
men is natality, i.e. a constant giving-birth of something new –– nods to Bergson’s élan vital 
                                                
19 Bergson, p. 236. 
20 Ibid., p. 221. 
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when she describes thinking and action as “pure being alive”21 in The Human Condition. So one 
could also draw a parallel between evolution and historical movement, the latter being, in a 
sense, the evolution of the political, with its own élan vital embodied in the natality of individual 
political actors.   
To be clear, Bergson is not saying that the past has no bearing on the present. On the 
contrary, the past always has a bearing on the present as it flows continuously into the present, 
almost to the extent that it is ludicrous to talk about the past as separate from the present. The 
problem is that it is impossible for us to know the exact way in which the past will interact with 
the present and the kind of future that fruitful interaction will advantage.22 Leon ter Schure 
makes a similar point: “Bergson’s nonmodern ontology… gives us a unique sense of history’s 
creative potential… While presentism has turned past and future into nonentities, parts of an 
omnipresent present, a Bergsonian ontology of time and history allows us to imagine the past 
instead as a living resource for the invention of the future.”23  
Tanpınar’s Bergsonism is often read to be in a similar vein. In a now famous newspaper 
article from 1951 on the state of culture and literature in Turkey, Tanpınar first commends the 
poets of the old for their consideration of each other, past and future –– “In order for each to 
complete one another within time, they envisioned the future as an indeterminate downward flow 
from their own thought and life… As the continual placement of stone over two or three 
generations eventually creates a building, so was it like this; people adopted an identity that was 
won over time.” –– and then goes on to claim that “this is the thing we have lost in the years 
                                                
21  Cited in Ingeborg Nordemann, “The Human Condition: More than a Guide to Practical Philosophy,” Social 
Research: An International Quarterly 74, no. 3, Fall 2007, p. 790. 
22  This is partially why I chose the word “indeterminable” instead of “indeterminate” in my discussion of Bergson 
above. We, as creatures of intellect and staticizing abstraction, cannot determine it. Maybe something else can do. 
23  Leon ter Schure, Bergson and History: Transforming the Modern Regime of Historicity, Albany, SUNY Press, 
2019. 
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following the Tanzimat: the idea of this continuity and wholeness.”24 Ottoman and Republican 
modernizations were catastrophic because they resulted in a detachment from the past. 
Throughout his oeuvre, Bergson formulates a process ontology in all realms of life (this 
is what Leon ter Schure calls nonmodern ontology), which Jonathan Jancsary eloquently defines 
as an ontology “that claims that nothing in the universe is ever fixed” and “that everything that 
exists is an ongoing and evolutionary process (élan vital) without a fixed goal.”25 And the seed 
of Bergson’s entire thought can be found in Time and Free Will, which was his dissertation and 
first book, where the fatal mistake is shown to be spatialization (taking time to be like space, 
dividable and measurable), the result of which is a continuous detachment from tangible life as 
such, a cultural leaving-behind (as Tanpınar suggests in the case of Turkey), and an unjustified 
feeling of mastery over history.  
So when I say that I am interested in Tanpınar and Johnson’s texts as critiques of 
modernity’s thinking about and perception of time, I mean that I am interested in the way in 
which they write against spatialization. To press the point: in the ways. Which is to say: I do not 
read them as strictly political or historical works, but also, and even more so, as aesthetic-
philosophical texts — texts that take a stance against spatialization in an aesthetic manner. I am 
interested in the countermoves (images, jokes, linguistic shenanigans, et cetera) through which 
they formulate their critical viewpoints regarding the self, cultural trauma, and the historical-
political process (not progress). 
In the following pages: “A Reckless Mistress” focuses on the object of the clock in two 
key instances of Tanpınar’s TRI and what it does to its fellow lovers. “Jonas Blach’s Re-
                                                
24  Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar,  “The Change of Civilization and Inner Man,” Cumhuriyet Newspaper, 1951. Translated 
by Kaitlin Staudt and published in Global Modernists on Modernism: An Anthology, 2020, edited by Alys Moody 
and Stephen J. Ross, p. 205.  
25  Jonathan Jancsary, “The Future as an Undefined and Open Time: A Bergsonian Approach,” Axiomathes 29, 
February 2019, p. 61. 
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Education in Time” reconstructs one main character’s narrative as a journey out of and away 
from spatialized time, focusing on a house cat, trains, and a timetable as crucial images. To 
conclude, I draw parallels between their respective countermoves, and highlight the 
personal/psychological and the political aspects of freedom and oppression raised by Tanpınar 
and Johnson.  
  
 12 
A Reckless Mistress 
  
Our narrator Hayri Irdal's benefactor, Halit Ayarci (whose name translates to "The 
Eternal Regulator"), founds the Time Regulation Institute to synchronize all the clocks in Turkey 
to boost efficiency and productivity. Fittingly, the institute’s downfall is initiated by Ayarci's 
outrageous attempt to house his employees in Clock Villas, which, if people had approved, 
would have been designed by Hayri, who had just finished the architectural plans for the new 
building for the institute, which was modeled after a clock. This is high-caliber absurdist humor: 
we, the moderns, love clocks so much, as they help us track and manage spatialized time, that 
some of us may find it appealing to live in one –– a physical expression of the fact that we 
already, eagerly, live in the spatialized time of science instead of in Bergsonian duration. 
Much has been said about Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar’s The Time Regulation Institute and 
how it critiques Turkey's adoption of modern temporality. The standard interpretation of the 
novel sees it as a straightforward sociocultural satire of the radical modernization project 
implemented by the Europhilic Kemalist elite, which included the reconceptualization of time as 
spatial and history as linear and teleological. This radical change, however, resulted in a lot of 
cultural discord and trauma, as Turks were too far away from European modernity. A good 
example of such historical grounding comes from Pankaj Mishra, who has written the 
introduction to the recent 2013 translation: 
 
In the 1920s the Muslim-majority Ottoman Empire was radically and forcibly reorganized into a 
secular republic by Mustafa Kemal (better known as Ataturk), and everything in its culture, from 
the alphabet to headwear and religion, hastily abandoned in an attempt to emulate European-style 
modernity… They felt oppressed and humiliated by the power of the industrialized West and 
urgently sought to match it. But there was a tragic mismatch between the intentions of these hasty 
modernizers and the long historical experience of the societies they wanted to remake in the image 
of the modern West. Time, in fact, was rarely conceptualized as a linear progression in Asian and 
African cultures…26  
                                                
26  Pankaj Mishra,  “Introduction,” in The Time Regulation Institute, New York, Penguin Books, 2013, pp. vii-viii.  
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  The novel definitely lends (a lot of) hand to the interpretation that it is mocking this 
historical reality (and Turkish scholarship seems to converge around this take too). For example, 
early in the novel, Hayri claims that the more we wear our clothes, the more they absorb our 
identities and habits, and if someone else were to wear our clothes, they would start acting, 
thinking, and feeling like us. He knows this, because he has been through this. First he recalls 
how he fell in love with his ex-boss Cemal Bey’s wife Selma Hanimefendi when he put on the 
old suit he was given by him. To Hayri’s contentment, Cemal’s less desirable traits such as 
snobbishness and unfounded seriousness were not also transferred. Next he remembers the 
serious transformation he went through when he put on the suit gifted to him by Ayarci, who did 
not want him to come to the opening ceremony of the institute with the clothes he had “at that 
time”:  
... I sensed a dramatic shift in my entire being. New horizons and perspectives suddenly unfurled 
before me. Like Halit Ayarci, I began to perceive life as a single entity. I began to use terms like 
“modification,” “coordination,” “work structure,” “mind-set shift,” “metathought,” and “scientific 
mentality”; I took to associating such terms as “ineluctability” or “impossibility” with my lack of 
will. I even made imprudent comparisons between East and West, and passed judgments whose 
gravity left me terrified…27  
 
In short, with a simple change in outfit, Hayri is made into a modern man of reason and science, 
an instant Sir Francis Bacon. Tanpınar is mocking the 1925 hat reform that allowed Turkish men 
to wear only Western-style hats, while banning the fez and the turban from the public sphere (not 
wearing a hat was allowed). Ataturk’s reason for the law was that civilized men “must show how 
civilized they are through their family life and lifestyles.”28 (The counter-demonstrations in the 
eastern city of Erzurum ended with the execution of at least thirteen people.)  
 
                                                
27  Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, The Time Regulation Institute, translated by Maureen Freely and Alexander Dawe, New 
York, Penguin Books, 2013, p. 13-14.  
28 Kaya Genç, “Turkey’s Glorious Hat Revolution,” Los Angeles Review of Books, November 11, 2013. 
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There is, however, a serious problem with saying that the Kemalist elite was doing 
something out of nothing, and that Tanpınar was aiming at this specifically, as the former is not 
true: starting in the 18th century, the Ottoman Empire was flooded by mechanical clocks used 
mostly to stay in sync with the prayer and fasting times determined by the “mukavvit”s 
(timesetters), who, recognizing the increasing need, had also become horologists. That is to say, 
an Islamic time-management system that was eerily similar to Ayarci’s Time Regulation Institute 
(not punitive, yes, but still seen as an authority on the topic) was already in place in the Ottoman 
Empire by the eighteenth century. Later, the “long nineteenth century” saw the Ottoman state 
experiment with modern methods of time-management to increase efficiency and organizational 
power, which became the early seeds of a culture that equated time-management with work ethic 
and material progress. In 1880, Ebuziyya Tevfik translated Benjamin Franklin’s The Way to 
Wealth into Ottoman Turkish, from which the phrase “Time is Money” was absorbed wholly by 
Ottoman literature and journalism. The Turkish modernization project did not start in 1923; it 
was brewing in the 18th century and definitely on its way in the 19th century. What can be said 
is that the Kemalist elite were dissatisfied with the success and the pace of the Ottoman-initiated 
modernization project, and they wanted to use their newly acquired authority to hyperaccelerate 
things through government mandates –– and, as we know from Karl Polanyi’s work on 
capitalism in England, healthy and sustainable social change requires a proper, organic pace.29 
I borrow this historical correction to Mishra from Avner Wishnitzer, who claims that “in 
The Time Regulation Institute, Ottoman time is portrayed as being closer to ‘pure duration’ and, 
hence, related to one’s inner self. Ottoman time is represented in the novel by the time-setter 
(mukavvit) and horologist Nuri Efendi. For him, time was part of God’s creation, rather than a 
mechanism of organization created by humans. The exactitude that he preached was, therefore, 
                                                
29  Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation, New York, Farrar & Rhinehart, 1944. 
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derived from piety, from the desire to adjust human life to divine rhythms.”30 He continues that 
Nuri Efendi treated clocks like humans, showed passion toward them, and even “loved clocks, 
felt for them.”31   
While I agree with Wishnitzer that the Islamic/Ottoman time, as portrayed by Tanpınar, 
seems to be much more heartwarming and personal than the cold instrumental time of Ayarci 
(this warm/cold distinction comes from Wishnitzer), I disagree that the former is actually closer 
to pure duration. The change in the authority on time from a warmer to a colder one does not 
change the fact that there is an authority on time that disrupts the inner time of the living 
individual. Both the divine time and the modern time –– both systems relying on spatialization 
— are against pure duration, which dwells and flows within the individual. Özen Nergis 
Dolcerocca gives the same verdict in her article where she takes Tanpınar to be first a 
Bergsonian modernist and then a social satirist: “[Both systems] are… oppressive to the subject’s 
inner temporal flow and to plural and incongruous temporalities.”32 Yes, Tanpınar does criticize 
the actions of the Kemalist elite (there is little reason to resent Mishra), but the more 
fundamental critique lies somewhere else, with the more basic problems of time and 
temporality.  
One clever way in which Tanpınar delivers his critique, on which I will focus here, is 
through absurdist portrayals of various obsessive relationship(s) with clocks and watches. That 
the modern regime exemplified by Ayarci is obsessed with clocks is already made clear with the 
Clock Villas and the clock-shaped institute building. So now I want to proceed to Hayri’s rebirth 
when gifted a personal watch (and Hayri should be considered as both an individual and also a 
                                                
30  Avner Wishnitzer, “Modern Turkey, Real Time, and Other Functional Fabrications in Tanpınar’s The Time 
Regulation Institute,” Journal of the Ottoman and Turkish Studies Association 2, no. 2, November 2015, p. 391.  
31  Cited in Wishnitzer, who is using a different edition of the novel and translating it himself.  
32  Özen Nergis Dolcerocca, “‘Free spirited clocks’: modernism, temporality and The Time Regulation Institute,” 
Middle Eastern Literatures 20, no. 2, 2017, p. 181. In my humble opinion, Dolcerocca’s article is the most insightful 
one on the topic among what I have read. 
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stand-in for the empire and the nation at-large, as seen in the Hat Law example above); and Nuri 
Efendi, the Sufi horologist, whose personal relationship with clocks is best described as an 
instance of fetishism. The former can be thought of as a summary of the book’s critical attitude 
toward spatialized time, while the latter ridicules man’s relationship with it.  
 
Hayri’s Rebirth 
“When my father recorded my birthday in the back of an old book as the sixteenth day of 
the holy month of Receb in the year 1310 of the Islamic calendar, he did so with the same 
conviction as I do now, in proclaiming that Hayri Irdal’s true date of birth was the very day he 
received this watch,”33 claims Hayri. Three small but important things have to be fixed in the 
translation: (1) “received” muddles the locus of agency in the original Turkish, which literally 
translates to “the watch passed to my hand,” where the subject is the watch, not Hayri; (2) the 
Turkish text does not suggest an equality of conviction between Hayri’s father and him, but 
instead suggests that Hayri’s father was somewhat wrong, from Hayri’s perspective, in claiming 
that Hayri was born in the year of 1310 of the Islamic calendar (a literal translation, without the 
details, would be: “My father can record my birthday as 1310 as much as he wants, but I can say 
that my true birthday was when this watch passed to my hand); and (3) the Turkish reads not as 
“Hayri Irdal’s true date of birth,” but as “the true Hayri’s date of birth” (“asıl Hayri İrdal’ın 
doğum tarihi”). The statement, then, amounts to Hayri saying that his biological birth in 
(Islamic) 1310 was a false birth, as it was the birth of the false Hayri, not the true one. That is, 
the true Hayri was born with the passing-to-his-hand of the watch.  
However, Hayri makes it clear that he did not always see the watch as such a blessing. 
The paragraph prior talks about the internal conflict the watch initially caused: 
                                                
33  Tanpınar, The Time Regulation Institute, p. 21. 
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Twice a day, I would travel the long road between Edirnekapi and Fatih, taking my time and 
throwing each of my steps after a different dream. Though a passion muddled this happy life as I 
approached age ten. With the watch my uncle gifted me for my circumcision, the harmony of my 
life was almost broken. A passion, no matter how innocent, is a dangerous thing. That being said 
(“bununla beraber” –– literally: “with that”), my happy constitution (“yaradılışım,” “as God 
created me,” literally: “what-I-was-created/constituted-as”) prevented its fully taking my life out 
of its trajectory. If anything, it gave it a direction. That is, my life took a shape with it. Also maybe 
it opened the real door of freedom for me.34 
 
I offer my own translation of this passage to show an important grammatical ambiguity in the 
series of “it”s of the original Turkish (italicized by me above), which is not captured by the 
Freely-Dawe translation. The Freely-Dawe translation accepts the more direct reading of the 
passage: Hayri is recalling how the watch initially disrupted his life, but how, thanks to his 
“spirited nature” (their rendering of “yaradılışım”)35, the watch became something more useful, 
giving his life direction and shape, even opening the gates of freedom for him. Now, in this 
Freely-Dawe reading, the four “it”s refer to the passion that is the watch, but there is something 
peculiar happening with these pronouns, as, after the first one, it is not clear, from a strictly 
grammatical viewpoint, to what each “it” refers. The first “it” is definitely the watch, with the 
happy constitution preventing the watch from totally derailing Hayri’s life. There is no confusion 
there. The ambiguity is rooted in the second one –– “if anything, it gave it a direction” –– on the 
“it” of which Hayri further elaborates in the third and fourth sentences.36 So we need to (try to) 
clarify what this second “it” is.  
If we put the hermeneutical emphasis on “if anything” (the word in Turkish,“bilakis,” can 
also translate as “rather” or “indeed,” and refers to a kind of turn, a negation in meaning), the 
sentence can be read as: “Instead of derailing my life (because my happy constitution prevented 
                                                
34 Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, Saatleri Ayarlama Enstitüsü, p. 23.  
35 They also make the rather long Turkish sentence into a quite short one, almost an aside: “But I was saved by my 
spirited nature.” This undermines the explicit (and implicit) emphasis on Hayri’s constitution as a counterforce to 
the watch.  
36  The two “it”s I have not italicized in the first two sentences of this quadruplet refer to Hayri’s life. 
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it from doing so) my watch gave my life a direction,” or, in other words, “it did not derail my 
life, but instead, it actually put it on rails,” it being the watch. This is reasonable, but it is still the 
case that the subject in the previous sentence, which is “my happy constitution,” carries over, 
because the new subject, if there is one, is not explicitly named. Tanpınar could have easily 
avoided this confusion by explicitly naming the watch in the next sentence, and writing, say, 
“therefore, my watch gave my life a direction instead.” In fact, in the original Turkish, the 
subject is not even a separate word but only implied in the conjugation of the verb to be an 
uncertain third-person singular. (The actual third-person singular pronoun in the original Turkish 
sentence refers to Hayri’s life: “it gave it a direction.”)  
If we decide that this is not just casual or sloppy writing on Tanpınar’s part, it can be read 
as an instance of linguistic doublespeak. Perhaps we are supposed to read the passage both ways, 
at the same time, with the last three “it”s referring to both the watch and the happy constitution. 
The watch scenario we have already clarified. Let us see what happens when we take the “it”s to 
be Hayri’s happy constitution: “Indeed, my happy constitution gave my life a direction. That is, 
my life took a form with my happy constitution. Also maybe, my happy constitution opened the 
true door of freedom for me.” Hayri is quite explicit with how the watch almost broke the 
harmony of his life, and how his happy composition (his “what-he-was-created-as”) has 
prevented the watch from totally derailing it. An inner dialectic was already established there: 
the watch and its spatialized time versus Hayri’s happy intrinsic composition, which includes the 
pure duration within him. With this instance of doublespeak, then, the dialectic is furthered: 
“indeed the watch gave my life a direction,” but “my happy composition [too] gave my life a 
direction; “my life took shape with my watch,” but “my life took shape with my happy 
composition [too]”; and “maybe my watch opened the true door of freedom for me,” “maybe my 
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happy composition [did].” His watch and his happy composition: two oppositional forces that 
constitute Hayri’s inner conflict.  
In the next paragraph37 where Hayri designates the passing-to-him of the watch as the 
birth of his true self (instead of the source of conflict it is), he first claims that his “life changed, 
[with] its deeper meanings suddenly emerging,” but then goes on to catalogue all the things he 
put behind him, i.e. lost, with the arrival of the watch, which “started its job [upon arrival] by 
clearing its surrounding and embracing its life-space appropriately”38:  
 
I forgot about those two glorious minarets carved out of chipboard that my uncle had given me… 
and so it was for the enormous kite I so lovingly assembled with the neighborhood children in the 
courtyard of our house, and the karagöz puppet set I bought after pilfering scraps of lead from 
various parts of the mosque and selling them to the chickpea peddler, and Ibrahim Efendi’s fickle 
goat I sometimes took out to graze in the cemetery in Edirnekapı and along the old city walls, 
suffering its mischief when I knew all too well that the stubborn beast wasn’t even mine. For me, 
the importance of each and every one simply disappeared.39 
 
 
Chipboard minarets, enormous kite, karagöz puppet set, fickle goat –– what kind of losses are 
these? To start with the most general, these are all Hayri’s personal memories which constitute 
his perception of his own past. With the arrival of the clock, Hayri is made partially pastless. 
And in the case of minarets and the karagöz puppet set, this pastlessness becomes communal, as 
they symbolize tradition, Islamic and artistic. This is also further evidence for Dolcerocca’s 
argument that Tanpınar criticizes presentism in his work, presentism being the modern habit of 
seeing both the past and the future from the lens of the ever-powerful now, thus essentially 
obliterating them both.40 The very idea of community, too, receives a blow: from the minaret of 
his mosque reads the imam the call to prayer, inviting the believers to pray together; the kite was 
                                                
37  Which, a bit arbitrarily, starts the next subsection, because he picks up the same theme and continues, as if he had 
to stop writing for some reason and now he is back to it.  
38  Tanpınar, Saatleri Ayarlama Enstitüsü, p. 25. Note, also, the imperialism/expansionism of the clock with its life-
space. 
39  Tanpınar, The Time Regulation Institute, p. 21 
40  Dolcerocca, p. 188. 
 20 
built by Hayri and the neighborhood children; and karagöz puppet shows, a famous Ottoman 
shadow theater, was/is communal entertainment for Muslims during the holy month of Ramadan. 
With the arrival of the clock, they are no more important to Hayri, whose new state is one of 
blissful forgetfulness (even in regard to his own suffering: a paragraph ago he claims that the 
watch broke his life; a paragraph later he calls it, as it were, his real birth-giver).  
The kite-goat duo, however, also have something to do with Hayri’s direct temporal 
experience. As opposed to the acceleration of everything that the clock aims for (control of time 
= better organization = higher pace = higher productivity, which is just great from the 
perspective of modernity), a gliding kite and a grazing goat embody slowness, and we only have 
to look to ourselves to realize that slowness increases the awareness of time, of being in time. 
Don’t we say, when we realize that it is already 8pm after a busy, high-pace day, that we “didn’t 
realize it”, it being that time passed that quickly, that time passed at all? The watch would of 
course like to do away with this duo: they might enable Hayri to think about time, or, worse, 
dwell in it. He might, God forbid, realize that there is something wrong with the watch’s 
spatialized time.  
But, paraphrasing Hayri, the true Hayri is born with the passing-to-him of the watch. The 
question to answer: what does “true” mean? A pastless modern lonely man of reason and work 
(“The first day I picked up the watch… I was attacked by the questions of why, how, and how 
so”41)? But we know Hayri does not succeed in being that kind of a man. While he respects Halit 
Ayarci the modernizer, he is often hesitant when it comes to listening to him and obeying his 
orders (most pronounced when Ayarci asks him to invent a historical figure to validate the 
institute, which, as Dolcerocca points out, is peak presentism), and when he first wears Ayarci’s 
suit, he becomes more like him, but also swings back to his older “soft, complacent” self 
                                                
41  Tanpınar, Saatleri Ayarlama Enstitüsü, p. 30. 
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regularly, resulting in overall indecisiveness.42 The true Hayri, then, is the conflicted Hayri, and 
if you take Hayri to be the average Turkish citizen, you have a conflicted nation –– her dialectic 
unsynthesized, her limbo eternal.  
The result? “Need I say that only a few weeks after I received my uncle’s gift, it had 
become nothing but a mass of twisted and jagged bits of shiny and rusty metal and no longer 
served any purpose at all? The experience revealed two things to me: my overwhelming desire to 
take apart and understand every watch and clock I came across, and my total indifference to the 
rest of the world.” Can’t do with it, can’t do without it: a violent, destructive obsession, if you 
will, which brings us, thematically and narratively, to Nuri Efendi.  
 
Nuri Efendi’s Clock Fetish 
Fetishism, being a buzzword, means everything and nothing, and its use always risks 
some degree of pretentiousness, which obliges me to provide a history and a working definition 
of some sort. According to Roy Ellen’s overview,43 the concept of fetishism comes from the 
anthropological study of religion, and was popularized in the 18th century by Charles de Brosses, 
who thought that the primitive peoples could not engage with abstractions directly and thus 
needed the help of tangible objects. Following him, Auguste Comte developed a theory of 
religious development in which religions evolved from fetishism to polytheism to monotheism. 
Later anthropologists such as E.B. Tylor rejected this claim, and saw fetishes instead as the 
physical objects either in which spirits lived or through which spirits worked. As the 
intradisciplinary confusion about the concept increased, many scholars abandoned it, but Marx, 
after reading de Brosses, used it to describe the nature of commodities. Commodities, he claimed 
                                                
42  Tanpınar, The Time Regulation Institute, p. 14. 
43  Roy Ellen, “Fetishism,” Man, New Series 23, no. 2, June 1988. 
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in Das Kapital, “appear as independent beings endowed with life, and entering into relations 
both with one another and the human race.”44 He saw capital along the same lines too. Lastly, 
psychologists defined fetishism either as the use of non-genital objects for sexual pleasure or the 
perception of inanimate objects and otherwise asexual parts of the human body as erotic. Freud 
would further specify it and suggest that the fetish must be the after-effect of a sexual impression 
from the individual’s childhood. Ellen suggests that in the core of these three types of fetishism 
lie four cognitive structures and processes that construct a fetish:  
 
1. A concrete existence or the concretization of abstractions; 
2. The attribution of qualities of living organisms, often (though not exclusively) human; 
3. Conflation of signifier and signified; 
4. An ambiguous relationship between control of object by people and of people by object. 
 
 
(2), which is animism and more than often anthropomorphism, and (4), which is the object being 
capable of acquiring power over the subject, thus becoming subject-like itself, are clear. (1) and 
(3), however, need clarification.  
(1): Concretization might mean two things: either something extremely abstract (an all-
knowing God; a nation) is made into something extremely concrete (a marble statue; an animal) 
or something that is treated to be concrete even if it is not (Ellen talks about “thingified” verbal 
signs), or, alternatively, a social relationship is objectified into a thing, such as in the case of 
money, which “is seen to ‘objectify’ transactions and reduce them to a single physical 
medium.”45 In short, an idea is made into an object that can be related to and worked with more 
directly.  
For (3), Ellen gives the example of the Catholic mass and transubstantiation, where “the 
host does not simply represent the body of Christ, but –– miraculously –– becomes the body of 
                                                
44  Cited in Roy, p. 216. 
45  Ibid., p. 222. 
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Christ.”46 In the case of a fetish, the object becomes the thing that it stands for, and is treated as 
such.   
After his uncle gives him a watch, Hayri starts skipping school and spends most of his 
time with Nuri Efendi at the latter’s atelier, where “there were only clocks.”47 Nuri Efendi of 
Hayri’s youth is a mid-height, skinny, but energetic man of sixtyish years old, who chooses to 
listen to all the watches in the atelier as he rests. He is a bit Sisyphean too: when he is angry or in 
a bad mood, he goes to the mosque’s courtyard and carries a seemingly ancient, heavy rock here 
and there on the courtyard. I suggest his relationship with clocks and watches fulfills all the four 
requirements of fetishism as described above. 
(1 – concrete existence/concretization): This one is not specific to Nuri Efendi, but is the 
general state of all clocks. A clock, of course, exists concretely, but additionally, it is the 
concretization of spatialized time, which, in Bergson’s account, abstracts the concrete inner 
experience of time. It makes spatialized time into an object, giving it a physical representation in 
the form of a circle that is divided into spaces, each referring to a temporal interval, with its two 
or three hands showing you “where” you are in this series of spaces.  
(2 – animism/anthropomorphism): As Hayri puts it, Nuri Efendi does not really separate 
clocks from humans. For him, they have hearts that stop and brains that malfunction, and when 
they are sick, they should be treated “like… patient[s], like… pe[ople] in need.”48 One of the 
clocks he is genuinely worried about is “missing both his legs.” That he sees clocks in highly 
anthropomorphic terms is made explicit in one of his philosophical reveries: “God made man in 
                                                
46  Ibid., p. 226. 
47  Tanpınar, Saatleri Ayarlama Enstitüsü, p. 31. 
48  Ibid., p. 32. 
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his image; and man invented the clock akin to himself.”49 Clocks, in one sense, are alive for Nuri 
Efendi. 
(3 – conflation of signifier and signified): A clock signifies time, which, in return, 
signifies order (prayer times, Ottoman bureaucracy, modern work regiment) and progress (“Time 
is Money”). Nuri Efendi has a habit of gifting watches to his poor friends, saying: “Take this! 
Take possession of your time… The rest is on God!..”50 And those who thus “take possession of 
their time” become happy as if they can thus immediately make things up with their wives, as if 
their child will recover from a disease faster, and as if their debts will disappear immediately. 
Nuri Efendi and his friends think of the possession of a clock as equivalent to, not only 
signifying, the possession of order (making things up, healing back to health, not having debt), 
which brings us to:  
(4 – ambiguous power relationship): Nuri Efendi, despite being seen as wise by many, 
doesn’t have much for education under his belt, except for one to two years of religious tutoring. 
He claims that clocks have been his teachers: “It is the clocks that made me a man!”51 Clocks, 
then, have immense power and control over Nuri Efendi, enough to reconstitute him into a man, 
while in fact, as he concedes, clocks are invented by humans. A similar ambiguity in the power 
relationship is also to be seen in another reverie of his: “Man must never forsake his clocks, for 
consider his ruination if forsaken by God!” In other words, if man forsakes his clocks he will 
suffer as if God has forsaken him. But isn’t man to clock what God is to man, i.e. its creator? and 
is it not the creation, according to the Islamic theology Nuri Efendi is relying on, that should 
suffer in the case of a forsaking? With the clock it seems to be the opposite, with the creation 
                                                
49 Ibid.  
50  Ibid., p. 33. 
51  Ibid., p. 32. 
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having more power over the creator –– in fact, as much power as the creator’s creator (i.e. God) 
has over the creator (i.e. man). 
Given that Nuri Efendi exhibits all four cognitive structures and processes of fetishism, 
we can diagnose him with confidence. However, on a much less pedantic note, and here I find 
the Barthesian punctum of the entire episode, there is one instance where Nuri Efendi can be 
accused of harboring sexual sentiments for the clocks he is tasked with fixing and setting up:  
 
Upon receiving a timepiece from a customer, he’d say, “Now, don’t come back to pick this up 
until I send word that it’s ready!” Or sometimes he’d cry out to a customer already halfway out of 
the workshop, “Now, don’t you rush me! For I won’t be rushed!” After opening up the watch or 
clock entrusted to him, he would place it in a glass jar and simply observe it, sometimes for weeks, 
without laying a hand on it, and if it began to tick, he would lean over the jar and listen. These 
deliberations gave me the impression that Nuri Efendi was more clock doctor than repairman.52 
 
I do not know what kind of doctors Hayri consults with, but none (that I know of) would undress 
their patients and simply watch them for even a quarter an hour, let alone for weeks (if they, 
somehow, do, we would report them to the authorities). I say “undress” instead of “cut open” –– 
which would have been more analogous, given that Nuri Efendi eventually “operates” on the 
clocks after he opens them up –– relying on Hayri’s initial description of (some of the) clocks in 
Nuri Efendi’s atelier: “... some supernaked, some only uncovered at the top…”53 His second plea 
to his customers, “don’t you rush me,” is reasonable: maybe he works better when not under 
pressure. But what about the first one, “don’t come back until I send word that it’s ready”? If 
someone comes and their watch is not ready, he can just send them back and make them come 
tomorrow, and maybe he does not want to be disrupted, but there is always the chance of some 
other customer coming and requesting something. It is more as if he does not want the owner of 
the supernaked watch to see what he is doing with it, as if he wants to have his private time and 
                                                
52  Tanpınar, The Time Regulation Institute, p. 29. 
53  Tanpınar, Saatleri Ayarlama Enstitüsü, p. 31. “Supernaked” is my hopeless translation of “çırılçıplak,” where 
“çırıl” (which means nothing on its own) intensifies “çıplak” (which means naked).  
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space with it, as if he is doing something profane with it. In the light of this reading, Ayarci’s 
Clock Villas and the clock-like institute building sound like ideas out of Ayarci’s perverse 
dreams, outgrowths of his erotic obsession. Not convinced? Just refer to the great wise(ish) 
pervert of high literature, dear Humbert Humbert:  
 
And I was such a thoughtful friend, such a passionate father, such a good pediatrician, attending 
to the wants of my little auburn brunette's body! My only grudge against nature was that I could 
not turn my Lolita inside out and apply voracious lips to her young matrix, her unknown heart, her 
nacreous liver, the seagrapes of her lungs, her comely twin kidneys.54  
 
 
Uh... Oedipus?  
On the one hand, Mother Meanest, giving Hayri a ruinous (re)birth. On the other hand, a 
fetish, an object of desire, a Lolita of a sort. After seeing what it has done to Hayri and Nuri 
Efendi, how are we supposed to make sense of the clock?  
I think the answer lies in the 1951 article I previously quoted in the introduction, where 
Tanpınar describes the Turkish disconnect from the past through Freudian lingo: “If I were 
brave, I would say that we are living through a type of Oedipus complex, the complex of a man 
who kills his father unknowingly.”55 Well, Tanpınar turned out to be brave enough to write so: 
Dr. Ramiz, Tanpınar ’s parody of a Freudian psychoanalyst (at one point he prescribes Hayri the 
dreams he is supposed to see at that point in his mental “recovery”), diagnoses Hayri with a 
father-complex, and even claims that Mübarek, the standing clock at home that shows whatever 
time it feels like showing, a non-clock clock if you will, must have dethroned Hayri’s actual 
father at one point. Their session comes to an end with Tanpınar talking through Dr. Ramiz: 
“Look around us, we are always complaining about our past, we are all occupied with it. We 
                                                
54  Vladimir Nabokov, Lolita, Crest Reprint, 1955, p. 151. Emphasis mine.  
55  Tanpınar, “The Change of Civilization and Inner Man,” p. 209. 
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want to change it from inside… What is all our talk about the Hittites and Phrygians? Is it 
anything different from a father-complex?”56  
If the past is our Laius, who is our Jocasta? On the way to whom does the modern kill his 
father? In whose arms does he wish to rest? (Okay, it does not hang itself, but:) The clock and its 
spatialized time, I suggest, is Tanpınar’s implicit answer. And Tanpınar’s parody of Freud, it 
seems, is only a pseudo-parody.57  
  
                                                
56  Tanpinar, Saatleri Ayarlama Enstitüsü, p. 115. 
57  For an unorthodox take on TRI that takes the psychoanalytic symbolism seriously and claims that Hayri also has a 
mother-complex, see: Süha Oğuzertem, “UNSET SAATS, UPSET SIHHATS: A Fatherless Approach to The Clock-
Setting Institute,” Turkish Studies Association Bulletin 19, no. 2, Fall 1995, pp. 3-18. 
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Jonas Blach’s Re-Education in Time 
 
One of the main characters in Uwe Johnson’s Speculations about Jakob, Jonas Blach is a 
philologist and a social theorist at the English Institute in East Berlin. He works for the state, and 
wants to stay loyal to it. Over the course of the book, however, we observe the decline of his 
belief in the scientific socialism of the German Democratic Republic. This is most properly 
exemplified in a late-in-the-book rant:  
 
A single infraction against the theory scares us away, but what if it was necessary?... And the Red 
Army’s advance against the Hungarian revolt is nothing but a successful experiment in the physics 
lab. Is it tolerable that reality takes place and we censure it according to its adherence to or 
infraction of theoretical rules?58 
 
Now, one could trace the story of Jonas’ breaking-off from theory and his approach to physical 
reality, but I am more interested in what enables the theorizing in the first place: the modern 
understanding of daily time as seconds and moments on the one hand, and the concept of history 
(from past to future) as scientifically comprehensible on the other. The feeling of comprehension 
and control induced by the abstraction of daily time through its spatialization into intervals59 
enables the modern man to come up with grand theories of the historical process, such as the 
Marxist theory of history (class struggle, labor revolts, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the 
promised land), supposedly explaining it all. 
So I focus on two specific scenes where Jonas gets the chance to reflect on his 
understanding of time and history in an attempt to suggest that Jonas’ rant against theory has as 
its basis the dissolution of that understanding. His encounter with Cresspahl’s cat makes him 
                                                
58 Uwe Johnson, Speculations about Jakob, trans. by Ursule Molinaro, New York, Grove Press, 1963, p. 212. As for 
the original German text, I am using the recently published (2017) critical edition: Johnson, Uwe, Mutmassungen 
über Jakob, Berlin, Suhrkamp Verlag, Rostocker Ausgabe, Band 2.  
59  “... in a word, we project time into space, we express duration in terms of extensity, and succession thus takes the 
form of a continuous line or a chain, the parts of which touch without penetrating one another,” as Bergson says in 
Time and Free Will (p. 101).  
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question clock time, while his coincidental presence at Jakob’s tower while he has to organize 
the passage of Soviet soldiers, who are going to Hungary to suppress a revolution, gives him a 
reason to question the Marxist theory of history, and whether history can be theorized like that at 
all. In the end we have a baffled Jonas, whom the state eventually throws into jail for disloyalty.  
 
Cresspahl’s Cat  
Near the middle of Speculations, Jonas is sent away by his boss on a working vacation, 
during which he is supposed to produce a text outlining his thoughts on a reformed socialism: a 
socialism that is less rigid and more humane. He decides to stay in the countryside with Heinrich 
Cresspahl, his girlfriend Gesine’s carpenter father. There he meets Cresspahl’s cat, who 
accompanies him throughout his writing process, lying on an armchair, wandering around the 
desk. The first time they encounter each other, she is seated on the chair “so upright and 
dignified”60 that Jonas feels the urge to greet her verbally, “good afternoon” –– to which she 
does not respond.  
Their relationship that starts with the cat’s non-response becomes more and more about 
communication itself, and underlying communication is always the issue of understanding: we 
communicate with each other to understand and to be understood. In one scene where this is 
explicit, she wants him, or seems to want him, to let her out by opening the window, which she 
indicates by “turn[ing] her head to his side.” Once he opens the window and she slides out, the 
third-person narrator declares, “he had guessed right: he had understood her”61 (er hatte sie 
verstanden).  
                                                
60 Johnson, Speculations, p. 133. (Sehr würdig aufrecht, a more literal translation of which would be “very 
dignifiedly upright”.)  
61 Ibid., p. 141. 
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Communication requires language, an array of both gestural (physical) (“turning her head 
to his side”) and verbal (“good afternoon”) signs, but its presence alone is not sufficient to ensure 
understanding. Occasionally there exists a basic difference in the perception of the thing to be 
communicated. Such is the case with time, I suggest, when Jonas, near the end of their 
encounter, bothers the cat while she is trying to sleep. They are within different temporal 
frameworks: the former within that of abstracted time (of hours and seconds), the latter within an 
organic one, that of Bergsonian duration –– and Jonas becomes aware of this perception gap as 
the scene comes to a close. I quote his internal monologue describing this non-understanding 
(which I will [ab]use as a springboard):  
 
Does it amuse you to write that kind of stuff, she said. One’s got to live somehow, everybody is 
best, chto lootshe tshevo. You wouldn’t happen to have a little milk, would you…?... See how my 
moustache quivers. When I wanted to go to bed, she was lying on her flank, beside her 
outstretched legs. I crouched by her chair. Our heads were on the same level. She curved her neck 
and firmly posed a paw on my wrist, letting me feel the claws. My hand wandered to her shoulder 
and to the hard sturdy neck and pushed the skin up toward her jaw. Until, in a single shiver, she 
slid over on her back and rolled her head against the arm of the chair and squirmed and stretched 
against my hand, but never completely off-guard. All of a sudden she came to, extremely cool and 
awake, and pushed me away with incredible elasticity, curled herself into a castle wall and 
immediately disappeared into sleep. I felt bad. I should have noticed sooner: at the proper 
moment. For a second I had bothered her. A cat doesn’t measure time in seconds.62 
 
“Does it amuse you to write that kind of stuff, she said.” German: “Und das schreiben Sie 
so zu Ihrem Spass?” What kind of stuff? We have one sentence of his: “we are incorrigibly 
dedicated to the notion of progress.”63 We are also told that there is a paragraph in Jonas’ 
monograph on “material and subjective consciousness.”64 He is, in short, writing a theoretical 
work, which seems to be a bit detached from the world. Cresspahl, while finding Jonas’ thinking 
“amusing,” describes his formulations as “sorcery… nasty cartoons of the world,” “an accurately 
                                                
62 Ibid., p. 142. 
63 Ibid., p. 136. 
64 Ibid., p. 143. 
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calculated world,” the “truth” of which “looked unfamiliar.”65 As he quips, “what did [progress], 
after all, mean?”66 Cresspahl’s claim that Jonas’ is writing “all out his own head” (aus seinem 
eigenen Kopf) turns out to have two valid interpretations: (1) he is writing out of his own head, 
without any other books as references, and (2) he is writing all out of his own head, expounding 
pure theory, as head is the home of intellect.  
To rephrase the initial question: does it amuse Jonas to write theory that is detached from 
reality? More importantly, who is asking this? Obviously not actually the cat, since Speculations 
is not a fable, yet Jonas imagines the question to be coming from her mouth. Either this is him 
interpreting the cat's gestures and attitude toward him as asking this question, or, or maybe at the 
same time, this is Jonas projecting his own worries about his enterprise on her, worries that have 
been brewing since he came to stay with Cresspahl. Jonas’ trip to Cresspahl’s town, the goal of 
which was to think, makes Jonas reconsider his position as a full-time thinker. He calls himself a 
“spectator of life… on the outside, apart, always ready to judge.”67 He admires Cresspahl’s 
capacity to be in the world, with other people and nature. As Gesine puts it, “my father is 
esteemed by the world and respected, and cats run after him.”68 Also note Cresspahl’s job as a 
carpenter: he is a work-er in the Arendtian sense, building a world by building furniture, objects 
that will stay in the world and constitute it. When Jonas gets to work with nature, sawing off 
branches, he feels “rather pleased with himself,” “very satisfied with his fatigue.”69 Reflecting on 
his physical labor, “he only wished that he, too, had worked on something useful and tangible 
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during the week.”70 A dire confession lies in his reflection: his theory work is both useless and 
intangible. 
But Jonas never confesses anything to Cresspahl, nor does Cresspahl say anything to 
Jonas about how he sees his way of thinking. Once does Jonas tell Cresspahl that he is only 
trying to speak his mind, which is not really a comment related to his thinking but to his 
character: he doesn’t want to seem hubristic. Jonas’ imagination, however, makes the cat talk, 
converting her into the vehicle of his (self-)interrogation. What Johnson might be suggesting is 
that their relationship is an exemplary encounter between (what may be called) pure intellect and 
pure instinct. The relationship between Cresspahl and Jonas is significant, as it puts a worldly 
man against one who is detached from the world, but they are both men, who are capable of 
reason and possess intellect. Cresspahl’s cat, however, is an animal, an instinctual creature who 
cannot work with abstractions, whose allegiance is directly to life itself. She is Jonas’ antithesis, 
his foil. 
  “One’s got to live somehow, everybody is best, chto lootshe tshevo. You wouldn’t happen 
to have a little milk, would you…?... See how my moustache quivers.” Jonas imagines her to be 
uttering these sentences too. All of them exhibit insouciance, characteristic of your average cat: 
the first one is a truism (unless one chooses not to live); the second one is a logical impossibility 
(if everyone is best, then no one is); tshevo (tschewo) might be a shortened version of Russian 
nitschewo, a word that, according to Katherina Filips, makes regular appearance in post-war 
German memoirs and means “it doesn’t matter”71. The fourth, her request, requires little 
explanation.  
                                                
70 Ibid., 133. 
71 Katherina Filips, “Typical Russian Words in German War-Memoir Literature,” The Slavic and East European 
Journal 8, no. 4, Winter 1964, p. 409. 
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The fifth one (in German: “... sehen Sie mal, wie mein Bart zittert”), however, while still 
nonchalant –– but also the last thing she “says” before Jonas starts petting her –– becomes more 
intriguing when combined with the third-person narrator’s peculiar pre-internal-monologue 
observation that “there were twenty-three hairs in her moustache”72 (“Sie hatte dreiundzwanzig 
Barthaare”). Why mention it? In conjunction with the time as movement instead of a collection 
of moments argument, I suggest: it is much harder to count the individual hairs of a moustache 
when they are quivering than when they are stationary. As they move, they blend into each other, 
resembling a brush. They lose their singleness and, if you will, become a continuum, a range of 
hair. Right before we read Jonas’ account of him petting the cat and her escaping the petting, we 
are given a more basic image highlighting the difference between movement and non-movement. 
While the latter is a collection of points/moments, hairs quite literally standing side by side, the 
former is them losing their pointness, blending into each other. And if life, as Bergson insists, is 
movement and change, treating it like non-movement and analyzing it thus, which is what 
intellect tends to do, will result in serious non-understandings. 
Now to the actual incident of petting and avoiding the petting. “I crouched by her chair. 
Our heads were on the same level. She curved her neck and firmly posed a paw on my wrist, 
letting me feel the claws.” Seeing that Jonas might start petting her (for the first time), the cat 
warns him with her claws of… something, potentially of her not wanting to be touched. 
However, he doesn’t get it, and “[his] hand wander[s] to her shoulder and to the hard sturdy 
neck and push[es] the skin up toward her jaw.” As if knowing deep inside that the cat will not 
like it, Jonas externalizes the petting by assigning the agency to his hand and not himself. That 
the act is somehow interruptive, and maybe even destructive, can also be read in the harshness of 
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the original German, which is rich in certain especially rough consonants73 (h’s, n’s, t’s and s’s), 
has two rhyming triplets (and one rhyming double), and is written almost exclusively in short 
words –– somehow reminiscent of a military march: “Meine Hand stieg unter ihrer Schulter auf 
ihren starken harten Hals und verschob ihre Haut zum Kinn hin.”  
This keeps going, “until, in a single shiver, she slid over her back and rolled her head 
against the arm of the chair and squirmed and stretched against my hand, but never completely 
off-guard.” What is lost in this translation of “stretched against my hand” is the visual and aural 
similarity of wälzen (wälzte gegen meine Hand) to walzen, to waltz. In fact, wälzen actually 
means to roll or to wriggle, both being much more fluid actions than stretching. She is countering 
the military march with a much less rigid, curling movement –– resonating maybe with a dance 
against Jonas’ hand, the choreography of which is not clear to him (hence neither to us), as if to 
mock the said march, marches being the epitome of choreography and fairly simple to predict. 
And the waltz, in spite of its rigid choreography, being a dance, is a pre-intellect, primordial 
activity that may be the closest thing for humans to pure free movement.  What is accessible to 
Jonas and us, however, are the (supposed) stops of this waltz, indicated by Jonas’s time-markers 
–– “in a single shiver” (in einem einzigen Zucken), “all of a sudden” (unversehens), and 
“immediately” (unverzüglich) –– one per sentence after the petting commences and until the 
petting ends, suggesting that he needs them to make sense of what the cat is physically doing. 
Her “incredible elasticity” is hard for Jonas to comprehend and needs to be made rigid, and is 
made thus.  
The outcome of the petting, and I suggest also of this rigidification, is her “curl[ing] 
herself into a castle wall and immediately disappear[ing] into sleep.” Earlier we got a 
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description of what that castle wall looks like: “higher at the curve of the back, lower at the 
semicircle of neck and head and all four paws plus tail; her head was almost completely 
surrounded by the rest of herself.”74 Simply put, she hides her head from Jonas with her body. 
The castle wall comparison, however, elevates the level of impenetrability suggested by this 
disappearing-into-sleep, as if Jonas has no way of getting to the cat now –– or, maybe, if we 
were to anthropomorphize the cat for a second (and we wouldn’t lack company in doing that: the 
third-person narrator claims once that she is “reflecting on many things”75), we could say that 
Jonas now has no access to the cat’s head, “head,” where her understanding of things such as 
time lies.  
So Jonas proceeds: “I felt bad.” The translation “bad” is a bit misleading, as the term 
betrübt in the German original would translate better as “saddened” or “distressed,” or even 
more literally, emotionally muddy, clouded. While the former implies guilt, which would 
simplify the reading by suggesting that Jonas simply regrets having bothered the cat, the latter 
implies an emotion that is directed more toward oneself. Jonas is sad himself, for himself, 
because he has no access to whatever the cat has –– but he is now aware of the perception gap: “I 
should have noticed sooner: at the proper moment. For a second I had bothered her. A cat 
doesn’t measure time in seconds.” The first two sentences expound his temporal framework of 
moments and seconds (recall the aforementioned waltz stops), while the third posits the existence 
of a difference. But this is only a negative statement. It is about the cat's non-understanding of 
seconds, and says nothing about how a cat measures time (if a cat measures time at all). Jonas is 
only reminded or left with the awareness of another way of perceiving and being in time.  
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In sum, then: Jonas comes to Cresspahl’s house to work on theory, but the more time he 
spends with Cresspahl and his cat, the more skeptical he becomes about his abstract enterprise. 
He is much more content as he saws the branches of a tree and interacts with the cat, i.e. as he 
gets involved in life. But he cannot fully understand the cat: yes, he can interpret her gestures 
and let her out of the window, but he does not, and most likely cannot, understand the cat’s 
internal time. He tries to describe the nature of the disruption using his own temporal framework, 
“for a second I had bothered her,” completely oblivious to what that one second must have felt 
like to the cat, for whom there are no seconds, or moments, but only the flow of sleep, which has 
now been cut short. 
That the pet functioning as Jonas’ foil is a cat, and not, say, a dog or a bird, is significant. 
No other pet is allowed as much freedom, and no other pet shows as much inclination for 
freedom. Dogs cannot leave their owners for more than five minutes, and house birds, when 
released from their cages, are likely to come back to their cages eventually. Cats, on the other 
hand, disappear for hours, jump on cupboards, and are only nice to you when they need food. At 
least, that is the mainstream image of a pet cat, and this image works rather well as an 
embodiment of uninhibited life. Their ballerina-like elasticity and flexibility also creates a useful 
contrast to the rigidity of abstracted time. What is also of value is the feminine article attached to 
the cat in German (die Katze, which the translation cleverly keeps by addressing her as she). 
Mind you, Johnson could have degendered the cat if he really wanted it by using the diminutive, 
das Kätzchen, but he did not, thus inviting us to consider the gendered history of this difference 
between reason/intellect and feeling/instinct, the former masculine, the latter feminine.76 During 
the Enlightenment, the masculine-feminine divide would find itself as the Mind-Nature divide, 
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science being a patriarchal marriage of these two, in which Mind, the husband, has dominion 
over Nature, the wife.77 In the scene with Cresspahl’s cat, however, Mind fails to comprehend 
Nature, let alone dominate it.  
What also needs to be highlighted is the seemingly formal and hierarchical aspect of the 
relationship between the cat and Jonas (which does vanish near the end, when they play on the 
floor together). Her initial description as sitting “so upright and dignified” and the use of the 
German formal “Sie” when she asks whether Jonas is enjoying writing theory paints her to be 
something of an authority figure, a teacher if you will. Furthermore, she doesn’t call it “stuff” in 
German, which sounds not only colloquial but also playful, but simply a vague “das,” which 
makes her “sound” much more condescending.    
 
Jakob’s Timetable  
Having finished the manuscript and resigned from his job, and having been dumped by 
his girlfriend (yes, Gesine loves Jakob), Jonas goes to Jakob’s dispatch tower to talk to him (no, 
not [really] about Gesine). Coincidentally, while he is there, a group of Red Army soldiers 
traveling by train to Budapest, Hungary to suppress the Hungarian Revolution have to pass 
through Jakob’s station. Jakob does not take the opportunity to slow down the army or prevent 
the army’s arrival in Budapest, which he could have done by cooperating with another dispatcher 
who was already doing that, but instead, he orders that guy to be tagged, clears the tracks of 
other trains (commercial etc.), and facilitates the army’s passage. After the entire ordeal comes to 
an end, he looks at his timetable: “There is a big empty square on the train sheet between time 
                                                
77   Bill Moyers, “Evelyn Fox Keller: The Gendered Language of Science,” Bill Moyers (Interview), May 6, 1990. 
 38 
and space, instead of the usual neat tight ingenious crochet work, and what runs horizontally 
through all this emptiness? three lines and a half.”78 
Some historical context is needed. The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 was not just 
another uprising against a regime under the Soviet influence. Lasting slightly less than two 
weeks, it was notoriously unorganized and lacked a leader. What started out as a student protest 
resulted in the collapse of the government and the rise of urban militias willing to fight the 
Soviet army. Writing on the incident a year later, Hannah Arendt would claim that the revolution 
countered the almost automated process in which Soviet totalitarianism had reproduced itself 
throughout Eastern Europe, and would suggest that “if there was ever such a thing as Rosa 
Luxemburg’s ‘spontaneous revolution’ –– this sudden uprising of an oppressed people for the 
sake of their freedom and hardly anything else… then we had the privilege to witness it.”79 
Here I will not engage with questions such as whether the government of the Hungarian 
People’s Republic, the GDR, and the Soviets were really Marxists and whether they were really 
the voice of the proletariat and so on. The fact that the Hungarian revolutionaries established 
Councils “to restore order and to reorganize the Hungarian economy on a socialist basis, but 
without rigid Party control or the apparatus of terror”80 suggests that they might have been the 
real socialists in that historical moment. However, it is still the case that all these states adopted 
ideologies heavily tinged with Marxism, if not based explicitly on it, and Johnson describes the 
GDR to be particularly so in Speculations. When Herr Rohlfs, the state agent, first takes Jakob in 
for a friendly talk, the narrative is interrupted by an anonymous dialogue between two people at 
a bar, drinking and speculating on what Rohlfs might have told Jakob: “probably gave him the 
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thumbnail course in history from the Theory of The Surplus Value to the intensification of the 
class struggle by the avant-garde… irrationality of life… which came into the world with 
capitalized private ownership of machines and raw materials and money.”81 And there is an 
exquisite delight in finding out that this caricatured version of Marxist thought (capitalism gave 
birth to irrationality? really?) is not that different from what comes out of Rohlfs’ automated 
mouth: “I based my reasoning on the facts. I told him that the Soviet Union abolished private 
ownership of machines and raw materials and the wage system… and after so much filth, 
incredibly, a new State was born which managed labor fairly…”82   
The most revelatory statement Rohlfs makes during their talk, however, at least for our 
purposes, is that “by now any means seemed justified against stagnation and regression, against a 
change back to the old; against all those who resist the change toward the new, the future.”83 The 
future is doomed to come, but Rohlfs, being a good modern and a Marxist, expounds a 
progressive view of history by bundling the future with the new and opposing it to “stagnation 
and regression,” thus suggesting that the new/future will bring progress (i.e. result in betterment), 
and thus legitimizing all the actions of the extremely new Soviet Union and its proxies, who are, 
supposedly, the real progressives and the vehicle of labor-friendly change, including the brutal 
repression of the Hungarian Revolution, which also could have been a positive change, but alas!  
 Rohlfs does not say this explicitly to Jakob, but the following comment by one of the bar-
drinkers lurks in the background: “The victorious capitalists abused the defeated and encouraged 
exploitations through private ownership and reinforced retrogression in life’s evolution on 
earth”84 (in der Entwicklung des Lebens auf Erden). That is to say, socialism is an evolutionary 
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step, a quasi-biological necessity, hence inevitable. These bar-drinkers say so, because the state 
says so, and they say so, because their Marx supposedly said so. 
Eternally moving forward, and inherently inevitable –– what better symbol is there for 
history, as understood by Johnson’s GDR, than a magnanimous train, with its tracks, on which it 
is dependent, standing in for the supposed predictability of history’s unfolding? And what better 
symbol for the theory than the timetable that shows the where and the when of the train?  
 A literal reading of Jakob’s timetable could be: as the Soviet troops arrive at the station 
and Jakob decides to let them pass, they have to stop more and more normal scheduled trains to 
empty the tracks for the army trains. The more trains they stop, the more the “neat ingenious 
crochet work” (the timetable) is disfigured — all the alterations must be recorded on it to be able 
to track them — and because they stop all the scheduled trains, an entire chunk of the schedule is 
trashed, which results in “a big empty square,” implicitly recording the time during which the 
army passes through the train station.  
However, the section building up to the timetable is littered with moments and details 
suggesting that the timetable should be read symbolically. When Jakob, right before the army 
passage starts, remembers that Jonas is also in the room, he turns to him and says, “All this is 
secret you understand, and if you’d rather go out,”85 but Jonas indicated that he wants to stay. 
That this matter should be kept secret is of political importance on its own, but what matters for 
us is the fact that Jakob turns and acknowledges Jonas (telling us to remember his presence too), 
who already has started his personal interrogation of how he thinks about time, hence also 
history, and who now finds himself in the middle of history par excellence, with the chance to 
experience first-hand how things actually happen. Then there is Jakob’s insistence, both before 
and after the fact, that there is no way to stop the Russians –– (before) “As though ten minutes 
                                                
85 Ibid., p. 194. 
 41 
made a difference,”86 (after) “They’d still have made it by tomorrow morning”87 –– highlighting 
the concept of inevitability. And then there is the moment when the waiting soldiers are “eager 
for a bit of conversation with the overtired irritated crowd that stood waiting,”88 irritated because 
their lives have to stop to give way to these carriers of theory. In fact, all life has to stop: just to 
let the soldiers go through, “trolleys and trucks and private cars and pedestrians” must be brought 
to a halt by “motorcycles” (unclear, but probably the city police) with “crossed, uncrossed, 
crossed arms,”89 which resembles the way in which columns of time and space (to mirror the 
narrator’s description90) interact to give birth to the usual neat tight ingenious crochet work, the 
timetable –– which becomes significant once you remember the potential incompatibility 
established in the previous section between theory and life.  
Such use of what’s happening in the streets with the cars etc. to interpret the timetable 
can also be supported by the extreme ambiguity of the sentence introducing the description of the 
timetable: “And now let’s see what we have accomplished?”91 Who is this “we”? What have 
“we” accomplished? This “we,” arguably, is everyone involved in the passage of the soldiers, 
including those who had to cross and uncross their arms.  
Now to the timetable as theory. On a usual (and even that, “usual,” is within the lexicon 
of predictability) day, it is a neat tight ingenious crochet work (ein säuberliches dichtes kluges 
Knüpfwerk). Neat, or clean: the lines are perfectly parallel, there is an abundance of right angles, 
it is the visual embodiment of order, it is order, it is eloquent –– but also “säuberliches,” too 
clean, disturbingly clean. Tight, or thick, or dense: little can get through it; it is not flexible, but 
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also it covers a lot of space, is overarching, tells a lot, or pretends to tell a lot. Ingenious (and this 
is probably the most telling attribute): carries the trace of a human, or, more specifically, of 
intellect; it is the product of intellect, and, for the observer, it has an allure, a degree of 
fascination, it results in an emotional obsession with rational perfection. And a crochet work: in 
addition to all that is already said, it exhibits a pattern, and more than often, it is only one pattern 
and one only. This, of course, is nothing like history, which is neither orderly, nor rigidly 
predictable, nor tamable by intellect, nor the repeat of an immortal pattern. 
And now there is a big empty square in the middle of this crochet work. Why? Here I 
extend the previously mentioned “we” to the real originators of everything happening in East 
Berlin with the Russian soldiers and Jakob’s trains, to the Hungarian people, to the We the 
People of Hungary. There is a hole in the theory because students in Hungary left their 
classrooms and flooded the streets to protest Soviet totalitarianism. There is now space on the 
paper that is disordered, loose, untheorized/untheorizable, unpatterned. That is, of course, the 
space of history: “A big empty square… between time and space.” In German: “ein grosser freier 
Platz… zwischen Zeit und Raum.” Big/groß highlights the significance of this space, of how 
much a group of people can do, i.e. alter reality, when they freely get together and revolt, to do 
‘etwas Großes’, something great, say “no” –– which is quite a bit. In fact, according to Arendt, 
such spontaneous events “constitute… the very texture of reality within the realm of human 
affairs, where the ‘wholly improbable happens regularly’...”92 The condition of political life, 
which is all human life, is that the unpredictable must, somehow, and paradoxically, always be 
expected, because, and here the original German must be considered, for this space is “frei,” not 
only empty but free –– it is the large space of freedom where people author miracles.93 
                                                
92 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1958, p. 300. 
93 Hannah Arendt, “What is Freedom,” in Between Past and Future, New York, Penguin Books, 1961, p. 169. 
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But people also need literal, physical space to act in. They need squares (here the English 
translation works), city squares, town squares, where they can get together and let their voices be 
heard, this being meant in the broader meaning of “voice,” vocal or otherwise. On October 30, 
1956, for example, armed Hungarian protestors attacked the State Security Police units on the 
Republic Square. More peacefully, in 1989, Chinese students would protest on the Tiananmen 
Square, the oppression of which was nowhere near being peaceful. That is to say, squares 
(Plätze) have always been crucial to revolutionary and protest movements as spaces of 
organization, cooperation, and action.  
And harking back to Bergson, this “square,” this figurative space being between time and 
(actual) space (zwischen Zeit und Raum) echoes the claim that illusions of determinism are 
animated through the spatialization of time. The space of history –– of politics, of freedom –– is 
such that it defeats all calculation by separating time from space, i.e. by disrupting the analysis 




A single infraction against the theory scares us away, but what if it was necessary?... And the Red 
Army’s advance against the Hungarian revolt is nothing but a successful experiment in the physics 
lab. Is it tolerable that reality takes place and we censure it according to its adherence to or 
infraction of theoretical rules?94 
 
 
Jonas nails it when he claims that the Red Army’s advance was a physics experiment, a physical 
intervention, the basis of which was a physics-like understanding of history that treats it like a 
natural system with seemingly reliable laws, using which one can predict its results. The Red 
Army’s intervention, from the Soviet viewpoint, was an intervention, a correction, a bringing-it-
back to the tracks of the train of history.  
                                                
94 Johnson, Speculations, p. 212. 
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But there are no tracks of history, as history is no train. The neglect of this basic fact 
results in the censure of reality whenever it doesn’t fit in the theory of history, the intervention in 
Hungary being one such censure. Then, the violence of the suppression was twofold: (1) physical 
(almost 4 thousand people died in sum, with near 15 thousand more wounded)95 and (2) (and this 
might be the more cruel facet) metaphysical, as in a violence against reality from the 
metaphysical realm where ideas reign over tangible reality. 
Jonas the social theorist, having realized all of this, is confused: “What is certain is not 
certain, what is will not stay that, and never becomes today right now. I don’t understand.”96 As 
the book ends, he enters Herr Rohlfs’ car, holding his wrists out for the handcuffs. We are not 
told explicitly of what he is being accused. Most likely: of treason, for working on reform plans. 
But also likely, at least symbolically: of losing some of his conviction in the age of modernity.  
 
                                                
95 J. Györkei, A. Kirov, and M. Horvath, Soviet Military Intervention in Hungary, 1956, New York, Central 
European University Press, 1999, p. 370; UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary, 
1957, Chapter V, footnote 8. 




Why do the employees of Halit Ayarci’s Time Regulation Institute oppose Hayri 
designing the Clock Villas after he built the institute (sort of) in the image of Mübarek, the 
standing clock from his childhood house? As Hayri reports, the same words crowd all of their 
mouths: “Oh dear, you cannot play with [i.e. mess with] man this much.”97 Dr. Ramiz, the 
psychoanalyst, clarifies: “Don’t mix them up, my sir! The home is to one side, human 
consciousness and science is to the other!..”98 Here lies, in a sense, the entire problem: modernity 
insists on the abstracted and staticized time of science as the time, and imposes it, in reality and 
in theory, on man, whose basic experience of time is one of flow and duration, and who is 
always uneasy in the face of hours and seconds. Goethe might have provided us with the best 
literary representation of this situation when he gave the elderly Faust, the modern man par 
excellence, the seemingly innate desire to dam the water and stop its movement. In the process of 
building his kingdom, Faust first goes delirious and then dies, after which he is dragged off-stage 
like an old useless rag by Mephistopheles’ minions.  
In the tactics Tanpınar and Johnson use to make their critical points clear, I see two 
commonalities that should be pointed out: (1) the use of the animal as a signifier of difference, 
and (2) the use of the object of spatialized time as a signifier of antagonism. 
(1): The way Johnson uses Cresspahl’s cat as a moment of revelation and education for 
Jonas has already been made clear in the chapter on Speculations. Their encounter is an 
exemplary one between human intellect and animal instinct, the former having little to no trace 
of the latter, hence incapable of understanding life in its processual nature. Tanpınar, too, makes 
use of an animal, the fickle goat that Hayri’s watch exiles upon its arrival. While it is true that 
                                                
97 Tanpınar, Saatleri Ayarlama Enstitüsü, p. 374.  
98 Ibid., p. 373. 
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the goat seems to be a minor aspect of the book length-wise (it appears on one single page of the 
almost four-hundred-page work), it is in what I would call the executive summary section of TRI, 
the first thirty-five(ish) pages where Hayri gives us an expansive overview of the rest of his 
memoir à la Bildungsroman. That is to say, it is there to set up the rest of the book.  
Also note how both animals are anthropomorphized. Such anthropomorphization allows 
our characters to connect to these animals with their own human means, enabling discourse of a 
peculiar, reflexive kind, i.e. allowing a discourse with oneself through said animals (e.g. Jonas 
talking to himself by putting words in the cat’s mouth). The most radical version of this in 
modernist literature might be T.S. Eliot’s Old Possum's Book of Practical Cats, his collection of 
children’s (?) poems about a community of extremely human cats, where, for example, 
Mungojerrie and Rumpelteazer are “highly efficient cat-burglars… and remarkably smart at a 
smash-and-grab,”99 and Growltiger, the racist cat, cannot stand the Persians and the Siamese. 
There, it is the reader himself who is pushed into a reflexive discourse, with the animals 
functioning as mirrors, showing the reader, and man at-large, at his absolute lows –– and I 
myself feel content when his victims make Growltiger walk the plank. As opposed to T.S. Eliot, 
Tanpınar and Johnson rely on the animalness of these animals, highlighting the inherent 
difference between animal and man, instinct and intellect.100   
(2): Jakob’s timetable for the trains and the clocks in TRI are analogous, as they both 
track where you are in spatialized time. The clock tells you your location in terms of hours and 
minutes, while the timetable, when understood to be a symbol of the Marxist theory of history in 
                                                
99 T.S. Eliot, Old Possum’s Book of Practical Cats, New York, Faber and Faber, 1939. Available from the 
Gutenberg Project: https://gutenberg.ca/ebooks/eliotts-practicalcats/eliotts-practicalcats-01-h.html#chap033  
100  This “inherent” difference is now being challenged by many philosophers, such as Gerard Kuprus, who suggests 
during a discussion of the possibility of animal suicide that “we should shift away from the paradigm of the 
Cartesian abyss of difference between human rationality and animal instincts” (“Continuum and Temporality,” 
Animal Sentience, 2018). There is –– thankfully, from my scholarly perspective –– no reason to believe that 
Tanpinar and Johnson were with Kuprus there. 
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Speculations, marks your historical progress. Both function as the loci of the antagonism 
between spatialized time and Bergsonian duration. Hayri’s watch exiling Hayri’s old life is 
described as the watch first clearing the space around itself and then embracing its life-space 
adequately –– the resemblance to Hitler’s Lebensraum is probably not by mistake, which would 
put Tanpınar squarely with the Adorno-Horkheimer evaluation of the Enlightenment. In 
Speculations, the Hungarian Revolution results in the “undoing” of the timetable, creating an 
unaccounted for space amongst the predrawn tidy boxes. With Nuri Efendi, the problem seems to 
be less of an antagonism than a desire-induced loss of control, which ridicules the idea of the 
modern man as one of unaffected reason, suggesting a contradiction between modernity’s self-
image and its reality.  
In directly using the object of spatialization to deliver critique of temporality, Tanpınar 
and Johnson are following a modernist tradition that extends (at least) to director Fritz Lang’s 
1927 sci-fi masterpiece, Metropolis, with the rather large “clock machine,” where the 
antagonism is represented through a battle of muscles between the man and the clock. The 
worker who is working the machine has to swiftly move the clock’s arms so that they point to the 
lit bulbs around the clock. It is an arduous process. They sweat; their faces reflect pure agony. 
When Freder, the boss’s son, decides to become a class traitor and tries to work the machine, he 
is eventually “crucified” on the clock with his arms stretched sideways, making it explicit that 
the clock, being a vehicle of control, symbolizes the oppression of the workers (Christ and his 
followers) by their bosses (the Romans). 
Similar to Lang, Tanpınar and Johnson designate spatialized time as oppressive, but not 
only in the economic sense. In fact, only in Tanpınar does the critique become explicitly 
economic, when the Time Regulation Institute, in an attempt to boost efficiency and 
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productivity, fines people if their watches are not synchronized to the state’s official time. Both 
texts, I would say, are more interested in the personal/psychological and the political aspects of 
the oppression(s) caused by spatialization.  
In Tanpınar, Hayri is attacked by the questions of why and how upon the watch’s arrival, 
questions enabled by the spatialization of time which underlies cause-and-effect inquiries. His 
happy constitution, however, fights back, the result of which is disharmony. This disharmony is 
also a national/cultural, and thus political, one, as the modernizing forces (of Tanzimat, of 
Kemalists) insist on a sudden detachment from the past for the sake of the future supposedly 
known in advance, hence not a future at all but just an extension of the present. Therefore, in a 
roundabout way, not embracing spatialized time becomes a crime, an act of political dissent.  
In Johnson, spatialized time first reveals itself as an epistemological barrier: Jonas cannot 
understand the cat. With the Hungarian Revolution scene, it is shown that historical determinism, 
an outgrowth of spatialization, enables direct political oppression, as it justifies all corrective 
interventions against those who resist what is thought to be the inevitable movement of 
history.  It is also significant that Jakob refuses to delay the arrival of the Red Army in Hungary, 
citing the inevitability of the revolution being crushed. He even goes on to say that it would have 
been stupid to abide by one’s convictions in the face of this situation. Johnson creates an 
opposition between principled political judgment and scientific reason, and the triumph of the 
latter within the political, it seems, results in one’s complicity in political oppression.  
To wrap it up, I would like to point out one last tactic by both Tanpınar and Johnson, for 
which I could not find an appropriate place in the paper proper: the idea of an accident. In 
Tanpınar, Hayri Irdal is impelled to write the story of his life after Halit Ayarci dies in a car 
accident. This is grim irony: Halit’s name means Eternal Regulator, and he, it turns out, cannot 
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counter his own death. The metaphorical nature of the event is intensified by the fact that it is a 
car accident, the car signifying not only technical expertise (remember Ataturk’s “positive 
science” as “torch”), but also the concept of movement (“march on the road to… progress”). On 
a much more direct level, however, it speaks to the impossibility of such eternal regulation, as 
spontaneous occurrences are facts of natural and political life, impossible to dismiss. The 
frustration and shock caused by this unpredictability is mirrored in the first sentence of 
Speculations: “But Jakob always cut across the tracks.”101 Jakob’s death is outrageous because 
he “always cut across the tracks;” he has been with the railroad for “seven years;” “anything that 
rolled on rails, if it rolled anywhere, he heard it, believe me;”102 and yet, he dies by getting hit by 
a train. Reason suggests that he cannot, he should not, die that way; it goes against the order of 
things, and yet, he dies. Then, to the question of “if always, how but,” Johnson and Tanpınar 
reply: reality, as it is free and creative, has a way of eluding reason.  
  
                                                
101 Johnson, Speculations, p. 7. 
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